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State Formation in the Shadow of the Raj:
Violence, Warfare and Politics in Colonial Burma＊
Mary P. CALLAHAN＊＊
Normally, society is organized for life; the object
of Leviathan was to organise it for production.
J.S. Furnivall [1939: 124]
Abstract
This article examines the construction of the colonial security apparatus in Burma, within
the broader British colonial project in eastern Asia. During the colonial period, the state in
Burma was built by default, as no one in London or India ever mapped out a strategy for
establishing governance in this outpost. Instead of sending in legal, commercial or police
experts to establish law and order—the preconditions of the all-important commerce—
Britain sent the Indian Army, which faced an intensity and landscape of guerilla resistance
never anticipated. Early forays into the establishment of law and order increasingly became
based on conceptions of the population as enemies to be pacified, rather than subjects to be
incorporated into or even ignored by the newly defined political entity. The character of
armed administration in colonial Burma had a disproportionate impact on how that popula-
tion came to be regarded, treated, legalized and made into subjects of the Raj. Administra-
tive simplifications along territorial and racial lines resulted in political, economic, and
social boundaries that continue to divide the country today. Bureaucratic and security mech-
anisms politicized violence along territorial and racial lines, creating “two Burmas” in the
administrative and security arms of the state. Despite the “laissez-faire” proclamations of
colonial state officials in Burma, this geographically and functionally limited state nonethe-
less established durable administrative structures that precluded any significant integration
throughout the territory for a century to come.
This article explores the relationship among violence, warfare and politics in the colonial
outpost of Burma, located geographically, administratively and politically deep in the
shadow of Britain’s flagship colony, India. I argue that the process by which Britain built a
modern state in Burma enshrined violence as the currency of politics. As in other societies,
war and crisis in colonial Burma created institutions with staying power, and in this case
―――――――――――――――――
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created relations between state and society that have been and continue to be what
Charles Tilly [1990] calls, “coercion-intensive.” Hardly the product of any colonial plot or
intention, the coercion-intensive institutions that have dominated governance throughout
the twentieth century were, as Florencia Mallon [1994: 69] suggests, “the products of pre-
vious conflicts and confrontations,” and were imbedded with “the sediments of earlier
struggles.” 
The exigencies of colonial warfare in Burma deposited the sediments of a coercion-
intensive political relationship between state and society. In this article, I show how ad
hoc colonial political arrangements hardened into durable institutions and practices. The
process of adding Burma to colonial India in the nineteenth century was far from smooth,
and engaged first the East India Company and then a succession of unimaginative gover-
nors-general in a particular variant of state-building that never paid for itself, never
accommodated any local interests, and never hesitated to call in firepower when the prof-
its of European firms were threatened. From the nineteenth century on, Burma was a ter-
ritorial and administrative appendage to India, serving as a buffer zone between French
Indo-China and India. As such, Burma was never a priority in British imperial policy. At
best, the British built a “skinny” or minimalist state, aimed at letting commerce flourish
(which it did) and paying for itself (which it never did) by taxation of land and some com-
merce. Paying for itself required pacifying the Burmese population following the three
Anglo-Burmese wars. The pacifiers—Indian Army soldiers—had no way to communicate
with locals and little information about the terrain or the unexpectedly dangerous enemy,
and soon came to see little distinction between new subjects of the Crown and new ene-
mies of the Crown. To a large degree, pacification was never entirely accomplished, and
the skinny state was filled out with the coercive muscles of British and Indian army units.
The power and modernity of this unprecedentedly organized force was not lost on individu-
als and groups resisting the skinny state. Resisters created anti-state martial organiza-
tions that became the core of every major political movement and party in the waning
years of colonialism and the early years after independence. 
This coercion-intensive state relationship with Burmese society did not remain static
throughout the colonial period. However, changes in the missions, character and make-up
of the colonial armed forces—as well as reforms of every other aspect of colonial gover-
nance—came out of negotiations and compromises between colonial officials and Indian
nationalists in India proper, and not out of any attempts to create channels of input from
significant social forces in the colonial province of Burma. In fact, colonial officials increas-
ingly identified most political and social forces in Burma as criminal, even as the same
colonial officials began to recognize the difficulty and futility of ruling the province in such
a singlemindedly coercive manner. As state-society relations in post World War I India
became more inclusive and more open to conflict and compromise, the colonial regime
began a 15-year process of severing Burma administratively from India because this was
the one part of the colony where political reforms were unthinkable. The separation
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process led to a reorganization of the security forces, which politicized violence along eth-
nic lines.
At no point in the colonial era did the British state-building enterprise in Burma carry
out any of the negotiation and bargaining with social constituencies that proved crucial to
the development of responsive, representative governing institutions in Europe, India and
other parts of the world. When local populations threatened the order necessary for suc-
cessful colonial commerce and authority, the state’s response rarely entailed any attempt
to win the support of political allies or resource-providers within the populace. Instead, the
British repressed, coerced, arrested, exiled and executed murderers and nationalists, rob-
bers and monks, and cattle thieves and student strikers. The formation of modern, bureau-
cratic states in Burma, as in much of the colonial world, thus established what Crawford
Young [1988: 5] calls “a command relationship [between state and] civil society, reflected
in its laws, its routine, its mentalities, even its imagery.”
Transplanting the British-Indian Colonial State
In the nineteenth century, diplomatic tensions and commercial competition between
France and Britain over the natural resources available in Southeast Asia and over the
security of Britain’s flagship colony in India led to Britain’s three-stage, gradual takeover
of all territory now considered part of “Burma.” In the three Anglo-Burmese wars of
1825–26, 1852, and 1885–86, British-Indian troops despatched from Madras and Bengal
defeated the armies of the increasingly weak Burmese kings of the Konbaung dynasty.
None of these wars were waged with a coherent, expansionist vision of a future “British
Burma,” and the state that was established by default in post-1886 Burma was simply an
appendage to the colonial regime in India. The Government of India paid the bills for the
expensive battles in Burma, and its model of administration and the bureaucrats to run it
were assembled in India and transported to Burma following the proclaimed victory of the
Indian Army in 1886. The colonial state was never “built” per se; it was transported from
India.
Unlike British colonies in Africa, state-building was never explicitly a military enter-
prise in Burma. There was never a Military Governor. Colonial administrators sailed over
from the other three provinces of India, bringing along English-speaking, mostly civilian,
Indian clerks to staff the state. Unlike in Africa, there were no significant armed
European competitors for control over Burmese territory; the British and Indian Army
garrisons established after the final annexation were strictly instruments of internal secu-
rity, rather than of foreign policy. In a sense, the British-Indian state hit Burmese terri-
tory running. It was comprised of a relatively professional, modern, tested bureaucracy,
developed over a century of experience in India and well-suited to the needs of the
Bombay-Burma Trading Corporation and other powerful commercial interests seeking a
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rapid establishment of law and order and an expansion of business opportunities in
resource-rich Burma. 
After 1886, colonial rule brought to Burmese society unprecedented changes, most of
which benefited British and other foreign commercial interests at the expense of the
majority of indigenous peoples. Many historians point to Chief Commissioner Charles
Crosthwaite’s implantation of the Indian system of local administration in Burma as one
of the most important causes of the destruction of the social and cultural fabric of late-
nineteenth century Burma [Crosthwaite 1968 [1912]; Cady 1958; Furnivall 1956 [1948];
Hall 1968; Mya Sein 1938]. Crosthwaite’s Village Act was passed as an instrument of mar-
tial law during the pacification campaign (1886–90) in villages throughout Upper and
Lower Burma. The Act broke up traditional local-level administrative organizations, which
Crosthwaite saw as giving rise to banditry and organized resistance to British rule. The
traditional, non-territorial ties of the indigenous social unit (called the myo) of central
Burma were replaced by the Indian administrative and territorial unit of the village. The
new village system led to a gradual but steady increase in centralization and government
involvement in the daily lives of the indigenous people. As Furnivall [1956 [1948]: 40]
wrote,
Even up to 1900 the people saw little of any Government officials, and very few ever caught more
than a passing glimpse of a European official. By 1923 the Government was no longer remote
from the people but, through various departmental subordinates, touched on almost every aspect
of private life.
If Furnivall is right, by the 1920s, the British had constructed a modern bureaucratic
state in Burma. Along the way, a whole class of traditional local officials were eliminated,
destroying centuries-old social ties at the myo level. In the process, state-building via the
Village Act actually paved the way for a longer-term trend of lawlessness and disorder.
From the turn of the century onward, Burma became the most dangerous place in the
empire, with Rangoon boasting the highest murder rates for any colonial city [Harvey
1946: 40]. While the destruction of local authority did not cause these increases in violent
crime—which more probably resulted from the dislocations experienced with the intru-
sions of the modern capitalist economy in precapitalist, agrarian Burma—it nonetheless
eliminated traditional social controls and curbs on lawlessness, which was the absolute
opposite of Crosthwaite’s intention. 
Coercion and the State in British Burma
Reorganizing Burmese society “for production,” in Furnivall’s words, required from 1885
(and arguably, from 1826) all the way through to 1942 a form of governance that one histo-
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rian likens to “martial law” [Trocki 1992: 120]. The political and combat roles played by
units of the British Indian Army in the early years after the 1885–86 war institutionalized
an unequal relationship between military and civil authorities—in favor of military
authority—that would greatly influence the development of future military and civil insti-
tutions in Burma.
Resistance and Rebellion
This military-dominated set-up did not come out of any coherent British or British-Indian
plans to build a state around coercion. In fact, the post-conquest role of British-Indian
troops was never much considered by the civilian or military authorities plotting the con-
quest from India. While British-Indian forces faced little effective resistance from the
Burmese king’s army in the final annexation, the British occupation of Upper Burma in
late 1885 sparked disturbances throughout the region and triggered a new round of resis-
tance, dacoity, brigandage and rebellion in Lower Burma. By mid-1886, “a truly formida-
ble rebellion had enveloped the country,” and the Government of India deployed upwards
of 16,000 reinforcement troops to back up the original expeditionary force [Cady 1958:
129–130; see also Hailes 1967; Ni Ni Myint 1983; Woodman 1962; Wylly 1927]. Ten mili-
tary outposts were set up throughout Upper Burma to attempt to control local resistance.
Although the resistance lacked any centralized leadership and was comprised largely of
small rebel groups and a handful of locally-popular “pretender-kings” hoping to re-estab-
lish indigenous rule, the violence nonetheless spread through every district of Upper
Burma and most of Lower Burma. Historian Cady [1958: 133] notes, “In many plains vil-
lages of Burma practically every household had some male member fighting with a rebel
gang.” A regimental history of the Third Gurkha Rifles, which served in the campaign,
blamed the expedition commander’s “error of judgment” in allowing “the disbandment of
King Thebaw’s [sic] army. . . . [H]undreds of Burmese soldiery were allowed to disperse,
with their arms, all over the country” [Woodyatt n.d.: 50, italics mine]. 
At the outbreak of violence in December 1885, British-Indian troops shot anyone
caught possessing arms or engaging in pillage; they also burned villages where they
encountered any resistance and conducted public floggings of alleged rebels. Another
Indian Army regimental history [Hennell 1985: 134] defended these harsh tactics, given
the Indian Army’s lack of expertise in guerrilla warfare:
In practically all engagements with the enemy we had to fight an invisible foe. The dacoits way-
laid our troops as they came up the river in boats or by road marches, poured forth a heavy fire
upon the advancing forces as they got within range. Not only was it difficult to locate the enemy
in their hidden lairs, but our men laboured under the vast disadvantage of having to force their
way through the close undergrowth of an unknown forest, whilst the enemy knew all the ins and
outs of their tangled labyrinths and were able to keep concealed. . . . Our only means of punish-
ment was to burn these villages.
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These ruthless tactics backfired on the British. Villagers responded to the repressive mea-
sures by banding together to attack military posts. Eventually, Gen. Prendergrast, com-
mander of the British-Indian expeditionary force ordered an end to summary executions
and village burning. Later, the 10 military posts were expanded to 25; detachments
patrolled actively between posts, breaking up larger bands of rebels into smaller units. By
February 1887, 40,500 British and Indian troops were fighting in Burma, and in some
areas of Upper Burma, armed garrisons were established every 10 to 15 miles [Cady 1958:
125–137].１）
By 1890, British-Indian troops had extinguished much of the rebellion, breaking up
most large bands of rebels and forcing pretender-kings into hiding. In Upper Burma, order
was maintained by 30,000 troops and Indian police; another 5,300 were assigned to Lower
Burma. The cost of the annexation and subsequent pacification campaign increased from
the original estimate of £300,000 to £635,000 in 1885–86, to more than twice that
amount in 1888 [ibid.: 135–137].
As order was restored to most of Burma, the majority of Indian Army troops were sent
back to India, martial law was lifted and a civilian administration took over in local and
national affairs. However, both British and Indian Army troops were garrisoned in Burma
throughout the first half of the twentieth century. In 1938, there were 10,365 army troops
in Burma; of these 4,713 were British (led by 358 British officers), in addition to roughly
3,000 Indians and nearly 3,000 indigenous Karens, Chins and Kachins [Notes on the Land
Forces]. 
Pacification and Internal Security
What did these soldiers do in Burma? Beginning with the pacification campaigns
described above and continuing throughout the colonial period with the armed forces’
deployment to put down threats to commerce and order, the function of Indian and British
army units was primarily internal security. As in other British colonies where early inter-
action between the populace and the military was coercive and repressive in nature, colo-
nial security policies “left a deep rift in army-society interaction” [Frazer 1994: 59]. From
the very beginning of the pacification campaigns, the first contact much of the population
of rural central Burma had with the colonial state was with the 40,000 British-Indian
Army troops in Burma. In those first years following annexation, Indian Army units also
pressed Burmese villagers into service for public works projects, including building roads
and railways.
Following the third pacification period in the 1890s, the reduced, peacetime contin-
gent of the armed forces served in two roles: first, as territorial forces, defending the fron-
―――――――――――――――――
１）The official history of the tatmadaw [Sitthamàin pyádaik (War History Museum) 1994: 44] has
somewhat higher numbers: “In the fighting against Burmese rebels, the British used its
infantry, cavalry, navy, artillery and other forces, bringing their strength to 50,000.” However,
no primary sources are cited. 
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tier areas which were considered the major strategic threat in the territory; and second, as
a back-up to civil and military police charged with maintaining law and order in both the
frontier and the central regions.
In terms of territorial defense of the frontier areas of Burma, the British Indian Army
arrived in these regions as a pacification force, just as it had in the central regions. After
the third Anglo-Burmese war, some Shan sawbwas (traditional leaders) acquiesced to
British plans to establish indirect rule in the hilly northeastern regions. In exchange for
retaining their local authority over law and order within their domains, the cooperating
sawbwas granted British concerns free trade and commerce in their regions. However,
local leaders in the Chin and Kachin hills organized fairly extensive resistance to British
overtures in the aftermath of the 1885–86 war. Most local leaders in these regions had
been nearly autonomous under the Konbaung state, aside from occasional demands for
tribute; hence British intrusions were not appreciated. Eventually, the British were able
to convince most Chin and Kachin leaders to accept British authority in return for a
promise not to interfere with local politics and customs and not to undermine the local
chiefs’ taxation powers with their subjects. When a few local leaders refused to grant
British demands, the British Indian Army conducted punitive raids on those areas.
The army’s ongoing role in the internal affairs of the frontier regions was fairly mini-
mal from the conclusion of the pacification period through the 1930s. As Taylor [1987: 160]
argued:
During much of the British period, the central state’s authority in more remote areas amounted
to little more than periodic “flag marches” in which the symbol of state supremacy was displayed
and the promise of punishment for unruly behavior was made.
Occasionally, the British representative in a Shan state called upon British-Indian troops
to put down a popular rebellion sparked by a tax increase or other repressive measure
undertaken by one of the sawbwas. However, most of the colonial period was characterized
by relative peace in the hill regions, and whatever conflicts arose between villages and
tribes usually were resolved peacefully, given the threat of punishment by British-Indian
troops. With the approach of World War II, the Shan states, in particular, emerged as a
region of strategic threat in the colony. For centuries, these regions had been vulnerable to
or even been the bases of invading armies that attacked the Irrawaddy basin. In the build-
up of forces preceding the war, Britain developed a more extensive territorial defence of
the hill regions, allowing Shan sawbwas to recruit their own military forces and deploying
more than 10,000 other Frontier Force troops in the frontier areas.
Nonetheless, the significance of this expansion should not be overstated. It is impor-
tant to note that throughout the colonial period and right up until the Japanese invasion,
British officials did not perceive any imminent threat to the borders of Burma. Hence,
according to a 1938 Colonial Office assessment of the armed forces in Burma, “the primary
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role of the Army in Burma” throughout the colonial era was not border defense but instead
“Internal Security” [Notes on the Land Forces]. As far as the British-Indian Army was con-
cerned, Burma was never a strategic concern, and as such received little consideration in
army policy reviews even after World War II had begun in Europe.
Responsibility for internal security in the central plains region was the main occupa-
tion of the military. Formally this responsibility was divided between police and military
units, but the British were never able to establish a functional police force in Burma.
During the pacification campaign that followed the second Anglo-Burmese war, the British
raised indigenous local police forces to maintain law and order in the villages and towns.
At first, British officials tried to identify a traditional village leader who could take over
police duties and chose the kyedangyi, the largest taxpayer who traditionally assisted the
thu-gyi (headman) with revenue collection and police responsibilities. In a typical British
colonial practice, the kyedangyi was appointed as an unarmed and initially unpaid consta-
ble. By the 1880s, the anti-British rebellions had undermined the legitimacy and authority
that the kyedangyis had long held, and the British had great difficulties recruiting local
police officers, despite their offers of attractive salaries. Nonetheless, the British managed
to reorganize local administrative units under Crosthwaite’s Village Act, and from about
1890 on, made the new state-appointed headmen of the amalgamated village units respon-
sible for maintaining order. In fact, the annual reports of the colonial provincial govern-
ment in Burma placed the summary of “village affairs” in the section headed, “police
administration” [Furnivall 1956 [1948]: 75]. 
Later, the British gave up this police conscription system at the local level and tried to
centralize law enforcement administration. The Deputy Commissioner of each district was
assigned a District Superintendent of Police (DSP), about half of whom were British or
Indian, while the other half were mostly Anglo-Burmans and Karens from Lower Burma.
Under the DSP were locally-recruited town and village constables, most of whom were
unarmed until the late 1930s when the administration authorized each village to hold two
or three firearms to ward off bandits. 
The Village Act and the increasing destruction of the rural agrarian economy created
the conditions that led to Burma being “consistently the most criminal province in the
empire” throughout the twentieth century colonial period [Christian 1942: 152].２） The
British-Indian Government responded to this problem by authorizing frequent enlarge-
ments and reorganizations of the more centralized civilian police force. As Donnison [1953:
42] noted: “The accepted treatment was to strengthen that part of the administration
whose task it was to combat the criminal, but this cure proved to be no cure for the dis-
ease—it was scarcely a palliative.” Observed another former civil servant:
―――――――――――――――――
２）According to Harvey [1946: 38], “England and Wales, with 40 million people, have 140 murders
a year; Burma, with only 15 million, had 900.
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The population was growing rapidly, but crime grew more rapidly. Between 1900 and the out-
break of war in 1914 the population increased by about 15 percent, the number of police rose
from one for every 789 people to one for every 744, but crime increased by 26 percent. [Furnivall
1956 [1948]: 139]３）
In areas with higher-than-average crime rates, the civilian police were reinforced by “puni-
tive police.” Under the Police Act, collective penalties were imposed over localities by quar-
tering a unit of this Indian-dominated, armed police force, paid for by fees added to the
land taxes of the local community. Still, crime rates continued to increase. From 1911 to
1921, the population increased by about 9 percent, but the increase of major crimes
“ranged from 31 percent in the case of murder to 109 percent in the case of robbery and
dacoity” [Government of India 1920–21, quoted in Furnivall 1956 [1948]: 139].
The corruption of the “ill-educated, ill-paid policemen” became a favorite target for
Burmese nationalist politicians in the early 1920s, in part because of the sorry state of the
civilian police forces, but also because “of the political control exercised by the police”
[Moscotti 1974: 37]. One of the first acts of the Legislative Council established under the
new 1923 constitution was an attempt to clean up the civilian police force by increasing
pay to qualified officers and terminating the contracts of corrupt, unqualified ones.
However, the attempt failed miserably when a subsequent increase in robbery and dacoity
forced the reinstatement of the fired officers and the re-lowering of standards.
These failures to establish any kind of effective local policing established the pattern
of order maintenance that exists to today: when local affairs get unruly, the state sends in
the military. The ineffectiveness of the civilian police led to the deployment of units of the
Indian and British army and the expansion of the Military Police in times of trouble. The
Military Police were established in 1886 for use in the final pacification campaign and
grew to nine battalions by 1935 [Prasad 1963: 42]. Unlike the civilian police with its
indigenous recruits, the Military Police consisted of almost entirely of Indians, with
British officers in command positions usually on secondment from the British or Indian
armies. They were the only police force to carry firearms regularly in Burma. Christian
[1942: 161] describes these units as constituting something of a strike force, “serving as
mobile, well-armed police for duty in case of racial disturbances, riots, disasters, and simi-
lar emergencies that cannot be dealt with by local authorities.” From about 1920 onward,
every year there was at least one instance in which the armed forces and the military
police were called out to put down communal, nationalist or labor uprisings. The most
prominent of these disturbances—the Hsaya San peasant rebellion of 1930–32—led to the
immediate deployment of military, supported by administrative units operated by civilian
police. Reinforcement troops came from India, and by June 1931, the British governor had
sent in roughly 8,100 Indian and British army troops to fight the small, dispersed groups
―――――――――――――――――
３）Furnivall derived his statistics from Government of India [1877–78; 1910–11; 1914–15].
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of unarmed peasants. Three months later, six more Indian battalions and one more British
battalion arrived from India, bringing British military strength to more than 10,000.
Additionally, levies of Karens were raised and armed to fight against Burman rebel bands
in the Delta [Cady 1958: 316].
Hence, beginning with the pacification campaign of 1885–90 onward, the coercive
organizations of the colonial state played a significant role in reorganizing Burmese soci-
ety for production for the world market. British colonial definitions of “crime” and “inter-
nal security” brought charged murderers, cattle thieves, robbers, rebels, Buddhist monks,
labor organizers and starving, scavenging peasants into a legal system that treated them
all similarly, and for the first time ever as enemies of the state. Facing these enemies, the
colonial state relied extensively on the armed forces and police to control nearly all forms
of criminal and political behavior throughout the colonial period. Even though widespread
nationalist-oriented political mobilization did not occur until the 1920s, the population of
Burma had had extensive experience with the military arm of the colonial state beginning
in 1886, with the frequent deployment of armed force in combating colonially-defined
crime. One of the “residues of the colonial state” [Young 1988: 28] which shaped postcolo-
nial state-society relations is this prominent role of the military—vis-a-vis other state
institutions—in controlling individual and social behavior.
Clearly, armed force played a significant role in the governance of colonial Burma.
The British state, which has long been characterized as “laissez-faire” in its organization of
Burmese society for production, did not hesitate to employ coercion when there was any
perception of a threat to British commerce and authority.４）The “laissez-faire” response of
the colonial state to the enormous social and economic dislocations that came with the
intrusion of the world economy and the commercialization of agriculture in Burma was to
attempt to arrest and coerce the victims of these processes. This was undoubtedly a skinny
state, barely capable of keeping the trains running and collecting enough land revenue to
pay its police. Beyond the main lines of communication in the central region, this state
barely existed. But where it did, it had big muscles. The slightest challenge to tenuous
colonial order provoked automatic deployments of armed force, establishing a coercion-
intensive relationship between armed force and the state, and between the state and soci-
ety, that carried over into the postcolonial period. 
―――――――――――――――――
４）Furnivall’s [1956 [1948]] characterization of the “laissez-faire” nature of the British colonial
state in Burma has never really been challenged. It is beyond the scope of this article to analyze
the full nature of state-society relations in the colonial era, but simply looking at the state’s
lack of welfare policy—as Furnivall does—misses the more “hands-on” approach taken to issues
of social and crime control. It is hard to understand how a state that destroys a centuries-old
traditional social system, imports more than 300,000 coolies from India to serve as laborers,
and maintains law and order by resort to armed force in most situations can be characterized
as “laissez-faire.”
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The Armed Forces in British Burma: Indigenous Participation
There were variations in the nature of this command relationship between the state and
the population over time and territory, most notably in the regions where the British
accommodated some of the demands of traditional rulers in the frontier regions. State-
building in colonial Burma, however, never followed the European-style state-building pat-
tern of contestation, negotiation, accommodation and compromise between state officials
and social forces. Nonetheless, the most enduring changes in state-building and the
deployment of coercion in Burma came as a result of contestation and accommodation car-
ried out by colonial officials and nationalists in India. The colonial organization of
Burmese society for production, extraction and trade underwent two major institutional
modifications under British rule that were outcomes of changes in governance in India.
From 1885 until 1923, Burma was designated a province of India, added to the existing
three provinces, Madras, Bengal and Bombay. Notably, prior to the arrival of the British,
most of the territory of modern Burma had never come under the rule of any sovereign
based in India. After the three Anglo-Burmese wars, all major decisions about the new
province were made or had to be approved by the Governor-General of India [Taylor 1974:
94].
The first change in this administrative set-up came after World War I, when Britain
began planning for India’s eventual transition to self-government. London’s shift in policy
came at least partially out of wartime pledges for greater political autonomy by British
officials eager to entice India to provide more troops for the British war effort. However,
the impossibility of Burma’s membership in a future independent Indian federation
loomed large in the minds of colonial officials and Indian nationalists. Britain began for-
mulating plans to treat Burma differently from the more “advanced” India. 
Accordingly, on January 1, 1923, Burma became a full Governor’s Province under a
new dyarchy constitution. The Governor of Burma was given a Legislative Council with a
majority of seats to be filled by election; additionally, local administrative bodies were to
be partially democratized. Most importantly, as Robert Taylor [ibid.: 90] points out,
Burma became a distinct entity in British policy from this time forward:
All of the major decisions regarding Burma from the 1820’s to 1920 were made in Calcutta or
New Delhi, not London. It was the decision in 1918 [implemented in 1923] not to extend . . .
reforms [granted India] to the province of Burma that first caused His Majesty’s Government in
London to take an active part in shaping Burma. After this event it is possible to write about
“British policy” toward Burma.５）
―――――――――――――――――
５）The separation of Burma from India was aimed at freeing up India from the “Burma problem”
British interests tried to do whatever it took to move their flagship colony, India, toward
Dominion status within the Commonwealth [Taylor 1974: 90–94].
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The separation of Burma from India was completed in 1935, when another new constitu-
tion was enacted (effective in 1937) providing for a distinct, separate colony of Burma for
the first time ever. It survived only four years.
What was significant about the two sets of reforms emanating from India was that the
character of the armed forces gradually became a political issue in Burma just as Burma
emerged as a distinct juridical and administrative entity in British policy. As Burma was
extricated and eventually separated from India, British officials and Burmese nationalist
politicians realized that the government would not be able to depend forever on the troops
of the Indian Army to keep order. By the early 1920s, leaders of the Indian National
Congress were agitating to bring all overseas units of the Indian Army back to India prop-
er, where they would be used only for defense of Indian territory rather than in the service
of the British Empire. 
It is important to note that the availability of the Indian Army for internal and exter-
nal security purposes in Burma first came into question at the same time Burmese nation-
alists began criticizing British policies that excluded ethnic majority Burmans from the
Indian Army. Although some piecemeal reforms were put into place to modify this exclu-
sion at the time of the 1923 constitutional changes, colonial officials never seriously
addressed the issue until separation was declared in 1935. According to former civil ser-
vant, F.S.V. Donnison [1953: 96–97]:
It was not until after the separation of Burma from India [in 1937] had actually taken place that
serious consideration was given to the problems of building up a separate Burmese army. . . . A
self governing Burma would be overwhelmingly Burman, with 12 million true Burmans as
against 4 million minority peoples. The majority race would be unrepresented in the military
forces of the new state.
This issue of non-enrollment of indigenous Burmese in the armed forces in Burma
actually needs to be broken down into two considerations. First, relative to British prac-
tices in the other administrative units of India—which was the reference point for indige-
nous peoples in Burma—participation by all indigenous groups in the armed forces in
Burma was extremely low. Second, an examination of the development of British policy on
non-recruitment of ethnic-majority Burmans throughout the colonial period will show that
this practice was something of a historical accident—rather than a coherently thought-out
policy—resulting from the timing of the annexation of Burma and the particular stage of
development of the Indian armed forces. In existing historical analyses, the practice of
excluding ethnic majority Burmans has long been characterized as a classic example of
British divide et impera.６）It is true that most of the British-recruited indigenous levies
―――――――――――――――――
６）This is basically the argument of all postcolonial “official histories.” See Sitthamàin pyádaik
(War History Museum) [1994] and Myanmà thamain (Myanmar Historical Commission) [1990];
and Ba Than [1962: 2].
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were members of ethnic minorities with some basis for hostility toward the ethnic-majority
Burman race, and in fact they dominated the armed forces on the eve of World War II.
However, the recruitment of ethnic minorities did not begin in earnest until World War I,
and the absence of any significant numbers of indigenous troops of any ethnicity before
1914 is at least as important in the development of military institutions as the absence of
ethnic-majority Burman troops from 1914–42.
At various points in the nineteenth century, British Army and civilian officials consid-
ered recruiting indigenous peoples to fight alongside the Indian troops. In 1824, the
Government of India authorized British-Indian troops to raise a levy of Arakanese to fight
the Burmese king’s forces in the first Anglo-Burmese War. As early as 1833, Mons were
recruited as soldiers to defend Tenasserim, although the British policy that the Mons be
paid less than members of Indian units posted there made recruitment nearly impossible,
and the unit languished, being formally disbanded in 1849. When the second Anglo-
Burmese War broke out in 1852, the question of recruiting local troops was reopened.
Commissioner Arthur Phayre was authorized to raise a light infantry regiment in Pegu
comprised at least in part of Burmans; but in 1861, when the threat of war with the
Burmese king had diminished, the Pegu Light Infantry and the Arakan Levy were con-
verted into unarmed civilian police [Sitthamàin pyádaik (War History Museum) 1994:
20–22; Furnivall 1956 [1948]: 178–184]. Over the next three decades, further attempts
were made to enlist Karens, perhaps because of the increasing success of the American
Baptist missionaries in converting Karens to Christianity and teaching them English. By
1880, the Karen contingent of the levies had grown, accounting for about three-quarters of
the two indigenous companies. At the outbreak of widespread violence throughout Upper
and Lower Burma after the third Anglo-Burmese War, the American Baptist missionaries
successfully lobbied British officials to recruit more Karens as auxiliaries to put down the
rebellion; they were disbanded at the end of martial law. In 1891, a Karen Military Police
battalion was formed, but problems of discipline led to the dissolution of the unit. The few
Karens who were allowed to continue service were distributed among the remaining bat-
talions, which were predominantly Indian [Furnivall 1956 [1948]: 180–181].
By the outbreak of World War I, the number of indigenous members of the army and
military police in Burma was probably no more than 300; the indigenous population in
1911 was 12 million [Government of India 1911]. While most observers looked back on the
early exclusion of ethnic majority Burmans as the source of great political tensions in the
later colonial period, these data suggest that what is more significant about colonial army
recruitment is the absence of any appreciable indigenous representation whatsoever in the
armed forces. Recruitment policy and practices were not functioning on the basis of a
divide-and-rule principle; instead there was no recruitment of indigenous Burmese of any
ethnicity. 
Because this non-recruitment of any indigenous peoples was especially stark in com-
parison with the British recruitment of local men into the army in India, one must look for
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an explanation of why the British did not consider this to be an important issue until the
World War I era. The explanation is rather obvious when one considers the make-up of the
forces garrisoned in Burma. After more than a century of development from the earliest
guards of the East India Company to battalions “of sepoys, drilled, disciplined and clothed
on western lines,” the Indian Army was “accustomed to European officers, under European
officers accustomed to Indian ways” [Furnivall 1956 [1948]: 178–181]. Each time the
Government of India decided to raise indigenous forces in Burma, it was because a Burma-
based British official had made an appeal to do so based on the projected cost savings of
not having to send Indian troops to Burma once indigenous troops could be trained to take
over external and internal security functions. In most of the cases, the units were dis-
banded due to higher-than-expected costs vis-a-vis the availability of cheaper, English-
speaking, already-trained Indian forces. 
The Armed Forces in British Burma: Divide-and-Rule
Recruiting for the new, World-War-I-era units followed the 20-year-old Indian Army prac-
tice of establishing single-race or single-“class” units.７）When the end of the war came, the
Government of India reduced its armed forces throughout all its provinces to a peacetime
skeleton. Hence, in Burma, as in the rest of India, recruitment was halted for all army and
military police units and many of the units formed during the war were disbanded. In
Burma, top on the list of units to go were the various Burman-only companies and battal-
ions, easily identifiable given the practice of establishing “class”-specific units. 
Furnivall argues that this policy to exclude Burmans came out of British concerns
about arming and training Burmans who someday might be swept up in the growing anti-
colonial nationalist movement [ibid.: 178–184]. The Indian Army policy of raising class-
specific battalions and companies had been established in the wake of the devastating
mutiny in 1857, and was similarly designed to contain political and racial tensions; in
India, this recruiting policy enabled the British to keep the “politically conscious classes”
out of the army [Prasad 1956: 84]. The British had been surprised by the nationwide show
of strength in the 1920 Students’ Strike in Burma, and there is no doubt that concerns
about Burman nationalism led to the policy of formally banning Burmans from the armed
forces. 
By the time of the 1931 census, the impact of the non-recruitment policy was clear
(Table 1).
―――――――――――――――――
７）Cohen [1990: 35–45] details the policy debate that went on in the aftermath of the 1857 Mutiny
over the shift from territorially-based recruitment to the new system based on race and caste,
adopted in 1892. The British used the term “class” to refer to one particular ethnic group or
caste recruited into the army; hence this system came to be known as “class” recruitment, and
the resulting units were called “class” regiments and “class” battalions. 
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Representing roughly 13 percent of the population, the Karen, Kachin and Chin ethnic
groups accounted for 83 percent of the indigenous portion of the armed forces in Burma in
1931. Clearly the policy to exclude Burmans—who comprised 75 percent of the population,
but only about 12 percent of the indigenous armed forces—was successful. The indigenous
contingent of the armed forces in Burma was 10 times larger than it was on the eve of
World War I, but the 3,000 new spaces created in the interim provided little access to the
ethnic-majority Burmans.
The 1920s policy to dismiss and effectively to ban Burmans from the army came along
just as the second generation of the nationalist movement was coming of age. Although
nationalist politicians were more concerned with expanding higher education opportuni-
ties and indigenous (and especially ethnic Burman) representation on the Legislative
Council, “[t]he belief was in the minds of Burmans that British policy to dismiss Burmans
from the armed forces [deliberately] segregated the races” [Myanmà thamàin 1990: 46].
Ethnic tensions had been on the rise since the early part of the century, and increasing
Burman resentment of Indian moneylenders, landlords, tenants and laborers led to bloody
explosions of anti-Indian emotion during the 1920 strike, as well as later in 1924 and
1931. Although various factions of the nationalist movement competed with each other for
popular support and disagreed over a number of contentious issues, all were united in
their opposition to the occupation of Burmese territory by foreign “mercenary” (i.e., Indian)
troops. 
Additionally, the Dobama Asiayone (usually translated “Our Burma Association” or
“Our Burmese Association”),８）founded in 1930 in the aftermath of four days of Indo-
Burman rioting in Rangoon and moving gradually to the forefront of the nationalist cam-
paign, developed a new target of anti-colonial, nationalist fervor: the indigenous (non-
Indian and non-Chinese) ethnic groups that collaborated with the British imperialists. The
dobama’s early successes in popular mobilization came in its campaign aimed at repudiat-
Table 1 Ethnic Composition of the Armed Forces in Burma, 1931
Ethnic Group No. in Army Proportion of Army Proportion of Population
Burman# 472 12.30 75.11
Karen 1,448 37.74 9.34
Chin 868 22.62 2.38
Kachin 881 22.96 1.05
Others## 168 4.38 12.12
Total 3,837 100 100
Source: [Government of India 1931, quoted in Furnivall 1956 [1948]: 184]
# The census category, “Burman,” includes Shans and Mons, in addition to Burmans.
## Includes other indigenous minorities as well as foreigners.
―――――――――――――――――
８）“Do” can be translated as either “our” or “we.” “Bama” refers either to the collective identity of
all persons in the territory of Burma, or more narrowly to the ethnic majority group. “Asiayone”
is translated as “union,” “association,” “organization” or “league.”
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ing foreign influences in language, clothing and literature and at affirming the traditions
of indigenous Burmese language and clothing.９）This campaign was not aimed against the
British colonial officials or Indian mercenaries, but instead targeted the indigenous people
who collaborated with the British, took English names, wore English clothes, ate English
food, and served the interests of the British. Kei Nemoto argues that the Dobama
Asiayone began defining “Our Burma” in opposition to thudo-bama (their Burma) and the
thudo were these collaborators who did not love their own country, cherish their own liter-
ature or respect their own language [Nemoto 2000]. Dobama writers criticized Karen
troops for their participation in putting down the Hsaya San peasant rebellion of 1930–32,
the 1936 student strike and the 1938 general strike. These deployments were considered
evidence of collaboration on the part of Karen and other minority troops and of British
attempts to divide and rule Burma.
Political Pocket Armies
With no opportunity to obtain military training in the armed forces, the Burman-majority
nationalist political organizations began considering how to prepare for the possible use of
armed force in their efforts to attain independence from Britain. By the mid-1930s, every
major nationalist or religious organization had established its own tat or “army.”10）
According to U Maung Maung, the idea for this kind of organization was initially dis-
cussed in the Young Men’s Buddhist Association (one of the early nationalist organiza-
tions) a decade earlier, “but usually the promoters became ambitious and made requests to
the government to open Burman military units to serve in the defence of Burma” [Maung
Maung 1980: 76]. The first “tat” was founded in 1930 by U Maung Gyee, a conservative
politician who was a former Legislative Council member for education and later (1940)
―――――――――――――――――
９）The dobama’s song became—in slightly different versions—the national anthem during the
Japanese Occupation and at independence in 1948. The following are the original lyrics of the
song:
Burma is our country,
Burmese literature is our literature,
Burmese language is our language,
Love our country,
Award [or praise] our literature,
Respect our language.
From Daw Khin Kyi [1988b: 1]. The above is my translation of the song.
10）“Tat” is translated as “armed forces,” “troops,” “military,” or “group of people assembled for
collective action.” These groups are often referred to in English-language histories as “volunteer
corps,” which was the translation proffered by some of the 1930s politicians in order to
camouflage their activities. I prefer to use “tat” throughout because none of the concepts in
English translation carry the same range of ambiguity between “a group assembled for
collective action” (with no connotation of violence) and “armed forces.”
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became the first indigenous Defence Councillor. U Maung Gyee’s “Ye-tat” (“Brave” or
“Daring” tat) was established to organize and give youths basic military and physical
training for the nationalist movement, and units were formed both in major urban areas
and in small towns upcountry. In 1935 and 1936, two prominent groups of young, universi-
ty-affiliated nationalists also formed cadet corps to provide paramilitary training: first, the
Dobama Asiayone established the Burma Letyone (Strength) Tat, and then the university
students’ union established the Thanmani (Steel) Tat. Additionally, older politicians like U
Saw and Dr. Ba Maw established their own armies, called the Galon11）Tat and the Dahma
(hewing knife) Tat, respectively. Religious organizations also established tats. Prominent
Hindus in Rangoon founded the Aryan Veer Dal to coordinate efforts of Hindu Volunteer
Corps. In Mandalay, the Thathana Alingyaung (Light of Religion) Tat was formed in June
1940 by followers of Premier U Pu [Taylor 1974: 188–189]. 
What is strange about the tats is that the British allowed them to exist at all. The
British colonial government not only allowed these tats to function, but the Governor of
Burma actually reviewed Ye-Tat parades on two different occasions. According to British
law, none of these tats could carry firearms, but they nonetheless carried out extensive
military drills and war exercises with bamboo staffs. Often wearing uniforms and
strutting publicly in formation, these tats provided “protection” at nationalist political
demonstrations, workers’ and peasant strikes and elections. Some modeled themselves
explicitly and proudly after Hitler’s Brown Shirts, and while their numbers as a proportion
of the general population were probably not very large, they nonetheless became a promi-
nent feature of public life.12）They were particularly visible at National Day celebrations
(held on the anniversary of the 1920 students’ strike), leading parades in Rangoon and
Mandalay, as well as in towns like Pakkoku, Shwebo, Myingyan, and Yenangyaung.
Although they carried no firearms in public, their military nature should not have been
difficult for the British to discern.13）Nonetheless, at no point in the prewar period were
Burmese nationalists ever arrested for their participation in these tats even though the
―――――――――――――――――
11）The galon is a mythical bird; the “Galons” was the name of Hsaya San’s forces during the
peasant uprising of 1931–32. U Saw was one of the attorneys who defended Hsaya San, and
was trying to remind the Burmese population of his association with the martyred hero.
12）Robert Taylor’s [1974: 189] analyses of British “Monthly Intelligence Summaries” on Burma in
1940–41 reveals that there were 743 “total live units” of “volunteer corps” operating in Burma
in June 1941. Taylor notes that some of these “never got beyond the ‘paper’ stage” and many
units were not active. 
It is important to note that the fascination with the Hitler’s fascist ideology and practice was
based on a fairly superficial understanding of it. These nationalists were trying to figure out
how to fight an extremely powerful imperial apparatus, and the idea of mobilizing the masses
in the cause of independence—as Hitler had done in the cause of national socialism—was quite
appealing.
13）Maung Maung [1980: 256] reports that the Galon Tat of U Saw was particularly inflammatory.
He cites an article in U Saw’s newspaper, The Sun, on 28 May 1938, in which U Saw
proclaimed he would build his army to a strength of 100,000, and it would be made available to ¡
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British Defence of Burma law and public order laws would have authorized such arrests.
In the immediate postwar period, Aung San defended the absorption of his anti-Japanese
guerrillas into a political army called the People’s Volunteer Organization (PVO) against
British criticisms by pointing out that “volunteer corps [like the PVO] existed in this coun-
try before the war and they had been allowed to exist without being a danger to estab-
lished government or law and order” [Aung San 1993 [1972]: 121]. 
One possible explanation is that British tolerance of these tats probably arose from
the characteristically imperial optimism that the tats would never turn against the
British. To wit, British civil servant Leslie Glass discussed the formation of these tats in
his memoirs. Even with the benefit of 40 postcolonial years of hindsight, Glass still main-
tains the tats were no real threat: “anti-British feeling was not widespread,” he writes
[Glass 1985: 131]. More significantly, the timing of the organization of the tats came dur-
ing a window of opportunity for such anti-state forces to emerge under an otherwise
repressive regime. After the Hsaya San rebellion, British policy makers began exploring in
earnest the necessity for a full separation of Burma from India, and as Donnison [1953:
99] noted, this was the point at which it became clear that Burmans eventually would
have to be recruited for the armed forces of a separated Burma. Additionally, growing con-
cerns about the threat of coming war in Europe were accompanied by concerns about the
practical issues of how to recruit soldiers from throughout the empire for the war effort, as
in World War I. Perhaps this was a time when the Burman-dominated nationalist tats
could be tolerated, with the objective that they might be incorporated into the war effort in
the long run. Taylor [1974: 188] argues that the British saw the tats “as a means of devel-
oping Burma’s capacity of self-defense at a time when the British felt that Burmans were
not fit for military service.” The incorporation of U Maung Gyee’s Ye-Tat into the British-
organized Rangoon Defence Volunteer Force supports this proposition.
Regardless of the reasons the colonial state tolerated the tats, what is clear is that the
organization of non- or anti-state tats—armed to varying degrees—had at least three
important implications for the development of state institutions in Burma. First, these
party-affiliated tats found a space to operate under the powerful colonial regime. The
space afforded to these nationalist party tats did not disappear in the early postcolonial
era. The proclivity of party politicians throughout the twentieth century to form “private,”
“pocket” or “party” armies are a direct result of the lessons learned by the tats of the
1930s. In fact, 1930s tats were active in the anti-Japanese underground in 1944–45 and in
early postwar politics, since surviving intact well into the postwar era and led by the same
Britain in the coming war in return for a promise of independence. He also published a column
in The Sun throughout the month of July 1938 listing the names of youths who had joined the
Galons in different towns throughout Burma. Taylor [1974: 189–191] reports that U Saw called
himself “commander-in-chief” and publicly announced his plans in 1938 to establish a Cadet
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prewar politicians. 
Second, the tats further institutionalized the ethnically-demarcated boundaries
between “collaborators” and “nationalists.” The colonial state had itself rejected most tat
members for enrollment in any state armed force on ethnic grounds. By the late 1930s,
after more than a decade of outright rejection of Burman recruitment and several years of
operation of non-state armies (the tats), the identification of membership in the govern-
ment’s armed forces with “collaboration” or thudo-bama yielded little chance that these
tats could be persuaded to cooperate with anyone comprising thudo-bama in the increas-
ingly threatened security environment of Southeast Asia. 
Third, it was in the organization of these tats that military terminology, institutions
and symbols were Burmanized. Ranks, words of command, and marching songs were all
translated into Burmese by leaders of the Ye-Tat and Letyone Tat. The 1936 constitution
of the Letyone Tat—called “The Constitution of the Most Dependable Army of Burma”—
included the first extensive consideration of military affairs written in Burmese during the
colonial period. One-hundred-fifty items spelled out regulations in Burmese regarding
membership in the Letyone Tat, as well as discipline, ranks, officers’ perquisites, training,
communication, and the relationship between the tat and the Dobama Asiayone [Khin Kyi
1988b: 113–147].
Too Little, Too Late
When the British finally implemented the full separation from India in 1937 and estab-
lished for the first time ever the “Burma Command,” it was too late to try to build any
kind of numerically significant, integrated army. By the time the ban against enrollment
of Burmans was lifted in 1935, there were few Burmans who could view military service as
anything but “collaboration.” And the existence of the various tats which provided military
training for a possible anti-colonial revolution meant that the Burmese and Burman
nationalists—unlike their counterparts in India in the same years—did not seriously
entertain schemes for infiltrating existing units of the British armed forces in Burma for
later subversion or simply for the development of tactical and technical skills.
Hence, the creation of the British Burma Army on April 1, 1937, was anti-climactic.
Units of the Indian Army serving in Burma (including the four battalions of the 20th
Burma Rifles and detachments of Administrative Corps and Departments) and the
Military Police were renamed and placed under the command of the Governor of Burma,
who served as Commander-in-Chief. The latter authorized a Burma Army strength of
about 6,000 soldiers to serve under 500 officers, but most of the soldiers and officers came
from renamed Indian Army units and few were recruited from the Burmese population. If
we break down this authorization and look at what Taylor [1974: 31] calls the “core” of the
army—the regular forces—we see a minimal role for ethnic Burmans in the all-important
infantry forces, which became the dominant service in the postwar army. Of the 22 officers
and 715 indigenous other ranks in the Burma Rifles infantry battalion, 50 percent were
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Karen, 25 percent Chin and 25 percent Kachin; only 4 officers were Burmans (Table 2).
There was a plan to add a fifth company of Burma Rifles that would be all Burman, but
the British never got around to raising it. Nearly all of the Sappers and Miners were
Burman. In addition to this “core,” irregular units included an Auxiliary Force with a total
of 81 officers and 1,784 other ranks active, and 1,353 other ranks in reserve; auxiliaries
were all volunteers of European descent, including British, Anglo-Burmans or Anglo-
Indians. There was also a Territorial Battalion with 4 British grade officers and 694 other
ranks; personnel consisted of indigenous volunteers, mostly Karens, though some
Burmans were admitted [Maung Maung 1954: 90; Taylor 1987: 100–101]. The only anti-
aircraft battalion in prewar Burma was comprised mainly of Anglo-Burmans.
At separation in 1937, the Military Police was divided into two forces. One was
deployed primarily in central Burma and the other—renamed the Burma Frontier Force—
was for use mainly in the excluded areas. The former group, still called the Military Police,
consisted of 4,294 men in 1941. Nearly all were Indians, and command was exercised by
British and Indian officers seconded from the Indian Army. The strength of the Frontier
Force was 10,073, including 7,376 Indians with the remainder coming from the hill regions
of Burma [Taylor 1987: 101].
Therefore, although the creation of the Burma Army in 1937 opened up the possibility
of access for indigenous people, there was still no serious attempt to involve ethnic
Burmans in what British officials considered the core of an army of a future independent
Burma. This probably can be attributed to the colonial regime’s preoccupation with inter-
nal security, which narrowed the vision of army reformers so that considerations of how to
establish a “national army”—in which indigenous minorities and the majority-Burmans
could cooperate in defense matters—were never really entertained. Scholar-bureaucrat
Furnivall [1956 [1948]: 183] summed up the British position:
If the problem of responsible [colonial] government had been conceived in terms of creating a
united people to which the Government might [eventually] be made responsible, the question of
building up an army would have been recognized as a matter of primary importance, but it was
Table 2 Regulars of the Burma Army, 1938
British Officers
British Burma Army# Burma Army#
Other Ranks Officers Other Ranks
Burma Company
Sappers and Miners
6 3 6 380
Battalion of the 
Burma Rifles
13 0 22 715
Animal Transport
Company, BASC
1 0 2 123##
Source:  [Taylor 1974: 31–32]
# Indigenous members of the Burma Army.
## Tentative only.
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conceived in terms of . . . constructing machinery that, if it could not do much good, could do no
serious damage; the military aspect of the problem was disregarded. . . .
Furnivall noted that the outbreak of war in 1939 led to a new emphasis by the British
to recruit any and all potential troops, regardless of ethnicity. Although some progress was
made toward including larger numbers of Burmans, the numbers in no way reflected the
proportion of Burmans in the colony. Taylor [1987: 100–101] reports the breakdown of
troops in Burma in 1941 (Table 3). Referring back to Table 1, “Ethnic Composition of the
Armed Forces in Burma, 1931,” we can see that the number of troops designated
“Burmans” rose from 472 in 1931 to 1,893 in 1941, increasing their numbers by a factor of
2.5. At the same time, the number of Karens nearly doubled, rising from 1,448 in 1931 to
2,797 in 1941. The continued higher recruitment of Karens per head of Karen population
(vis-a-vis Burman recruitment per head of Burman population) suggests that the colonial
regime had not made any significant changes in recruiting priorities and practices. 
Conclusion
The transportation of British-Indian rule to nineteenth-century Burma produced a matrix
of state institutions that gave primacy to order, coercion and armed force. In sharp con-
trast to the earlier mercantilist age of imperialism—during which India was brought into
the British Empire—the imperialism of the late nineteenth century produced colonial
states throughout Asia and Africa that were able to reorder society for production and
commerce at unprecedented speed. In this process, the transportation of a two-century-old
colonial system of governance from India to Burma wreaked havoc with traditional, non-
state forms of social control and created the need for internal security forces which would
come to control many aspects of indigenous people’s lives.
The imposition of Indian administrators and administrative practices in Burma
Table 3 Ethnic Composition of the Armed Forces in Burma, 1941
Ethnic Group No. in Army Proportion of Army Proportion of Population#
Burman 1,893 23.71 75.11
Karen 2,797 35.03 9.34
Chin 1,258 15.76 2.38
Kachin 852 10.61 1.05
Yunnanese 32 0.04 n/a
Chinese 330 4.13 *
Indians 2,578 32.29 *
Others 168 2.10 *
Total 7,984 100 100
# Population statistics for 1941 are from the 1931 census because the data from the 1941 census was 
lost in World War II.
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destroyed any indigenous social mechanisms that could have cushioned the impact of the
rapid insertion into the world economy. The resulting increase in landlessness, tenancy,
and indebtedness was responsible for the highest crime rates in the empire, and the
Government of India’s response to this rising lawlessness—which was to send in more
armed soldiers and police officers—was in part responsible for institutionalizing the pri-
macy of armed coercion in Burmese political affairs.
It should not be surprising that the British-Indian state relied on its relatively mod-
ern, professional Indian and British Armies to combat threats to colonial interests in
Burma. The British officials who occupied top administrative positions in the colonial state
were nearly all appointed from India never having previously set foot on Burmese territory
[Piness 1983].14）Their visions and plans about Asian colonies were probably derived from
their Indian experiences, which included communal riots in which armed troops were
deployed to restore order. These officials never really considered arming substantial num-
bers of indigenous Burmese. The imperatives of turning a profit in Burma gave these
short-term civil servants no incentive to screen, equip and train the locals, especially when
the Indian Army was ready, and—most importantly—cheap to deploy.
Throughout the colonial period, the range of activities that placed indigenous
Burmese in the line of fire underwent a series of expansions. During the three conquests
and the subsequent pacification campaigns, colonial conceptions of “internal security”
required British and Indian troops, along with a tiny handful of indigenous minority
levies, to eliminate resistance to British-Indian rule. By the early twentieth century,
“internal security” gradually became equated with crime control as rising rates of violent
property crimes, in particular, threatened the interests of British capital. “Internal securi-
ty” again was maintained by foreigners. The only significant numbers of indigenous people
in uniform were unarmed local civilian police, and stories of their ineptitude reached leg-
endary status even before World War I. With the emergence of the second wave of the
nationalist movement after World War I came a new state conception of “internal secu-
rity,” which gave the armed forces responsibility for fighting crime, quashing criticism and
preventing potentially seditious acts. The threats to the colonial state were rarely from
outside the British-drawn boundaries. More commonly the threats came from local popula-
tions in the form of such wide-ranging activities as cattle-thievery, highway banditry,
trade unionization, peasant rebellions, student protests and hunger strikes. This meant
that murderers and nationalists, dacoits and the Buddhist sangha, and petty thieves and
student strikers, all met the state at the barrels of foreigner-held rifles. Hence, from the
first arrival of a prefabricated, relatively rationalized bureaucracy in Burma in the late
nineteenth century, the state has been continuously at war with the population mapped
into its territorial claims.
―――――――――――――――――
14）Eleven of the first 14 chief commissioners or lieutenant governors of Burma were appointed
from India no prior experience of the province. 
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That the struggles of colonial politics and governance played out this way did not nec-
essarily overdetermine the rise of a militaristic postcolonial state. However, the indige-
nous elites who took over the national state at independence in 1948 started not with a
tabula rasa but with the rickety yet repressive architecture of colonial states that was at
odds with their anti-colonial ideological programs. With the immediate eruption of anti-
state civil warfare, Burmese Military and civilian leaders had few choices but to reinvigo-
rate and redeploy the colonial security apparatus to hold together a disintegrating country
during the formative period of postcolonial state transformation. For more than five
decades now, intra-elite struggles—whether in the legal, political arena or in the arena of
insurgent warfare—continued to be framed by and settled by violence or the threat of vio-
lence. 
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